MAC_PARTITION(4)

NAME

     mac_partition -- process partition policy

SYNOPSIS

     To compile the process partition policy into your kernel, place the fol-
     lowing lines in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC
	   options MAC_PARTITION

     Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time, place the
     following line in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

	   mac_partition_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

     The mac_partition policy module implements a process partition policy,
     which allows administrators to place running processes into
     ``partitions'', based on their numeric process partition (specified in
     the process's MAC label).	Processes with a specified partition can only
     see processes that are in the same partition.  If no partition is speci-
     fied for a process, it can see all other processes in the system (subject
     to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page).  No pro-
     visions for placing processes into multiple partitions are available.

   Label Format
     Partition labels take on the following format:

	   partition/value

     Where value can be any integer value or ``none''.	For example:

	   partition/1
	   partition/20
	   partition/none

SEE ALSO

     lomac(4), mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4),
     mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_portacl(4),
     mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_test(4), maclabel(7), mac(9)

HISTORY

     The mac_partition policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was
     developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS

     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Asso-
     ciates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.
     under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the
     DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

     See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.	The TrustedBSD
     MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
     the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
     in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.